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This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing 
consumption taxes into an otherwise deterministic version of the standard neoclassical 
growth model with income taxes only and heterogeneity across agents. In particular, the 
economic agents differ among each other with respect to whether they are allowed to save 
(in physical capital) or not. Policy is optimally chosen by a benevolent Ramsey 
government. The main theoretical finding comes to confirm the widespread belief that the 
introduction of consumption taxes into a model with income taxes only, creates substantial 
efficiency gains for the economy as whole, but at the cost of higher income inequality. In 
other words, consumption taxes reduce the progressivity of the tax system, and maybe, 
from a normative point of view, this result justifies the design of a set of subsidies policies 
which will aim to outweigh the regressive effects of the otherwise more efficient 
consumption taxes. 
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1    Introduction 
The literature on optimal taxation typically focuses on income taxes and rules out consumption 
taxes. For example, Chamley (1986), Judd (1985) and Lucas (1990) assumed that the 
consumption of goods is untaxed in each period and that there are only taxes on income from 
savings and labour. However, consumption taxes are a very popular tax policy instrument, in 
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the hands of policymakers, and this can be confirmed by their widespread use in most 
industrialized economies. For instance, according to Table 1 below, average effective 
consumption tax rates are about 22.1% in a sample of 25 countries, where data are taken by 
Eurostat for a ten year period (2002-2010). The estimates regarding average effective 
consumption tax rates vary considerably across countries. For example, in the aforementioned 
sample of countries, the average effective consumption tax rates are between 15.1 and 32.7. 
Furthermore, revenues from consumption taxes represent a significant proportion of total tax 
revenues. For instance, the average percentage of revenues from consumption taxes over total 
tax revenues for the same sample is about 33.2%. For a number of countries, such as Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Portugal, this percentage is even higher and exceeds 38%. 
This popularity of consumption taxes, as a policy instrument in the hands of policymakers, 
can be explained by the widespread belief, that they are a less distortive policy instrument 
relative to income taxes and, thus, increase aggregate efficiency (see e.g. Coleman (2000), 
Correia (2010) and many others). However, consumption taxes are also believed to increase 
income inequality and, thus, hurt the medium and low income social classes. Motivated by the 
above, this paper aims to study the role of consumption taxes in a two-period deterministic 
version of the neoclassical growth model. Following most of the relevant literature, we follow 
the Ramsey approach to the optimal tax policy problem according to which the government is 
able to commit to future policies1. By allowing the government to choose optimally the tax mix 
(between income and consumption taxes), we aim to study the tradeoff between efficiency and 
redistribution. 
To capture the distributional implications, we need to distinguish among the various 
economic agents so as to generate a potential conflict of interests. According to Turnovsky 
(2000), the most common distinction in the literature that creates a potential conflict of interests 
is the functional distribution between income going to capital and that going to labour. Thus, 
we work with a two-period deterministic version of Judd's (1985) neoclassical growth model, 
in which households differ in capital holdings. In particular, we assume that there are two 
groups of households, called capitalists and workers, where capital is in the hands of capitalists, 
while workers, who form the majority in our economy, are not allowed to save2. Moreover, we 
assume that capitalists are more skilled than workers and, thus, the aggregate labor input is a 
                                                 
1 Following most of the relevant literature, we focus only on the optimal tax setting under commitment 
and rule out the study of time-consistent fiscal policies (for a review of the literature on time-consistent 
optimal tax policy with consumption taxes in infinite-horizon models, see e.g. Laczo and Rossi (2014) 
and Motta and Rossi (2015) ). 
2 This has been one of the most commonly used models with heterogeneity in the literature on optimal 
taxation. See also Lansing (1999), Krusell (2002) and Fowler and Young (2006). 
 
ECONOMIDES, RIZOS     Optimal Taxation, Efficiency and Redistribution 
 
 3
linear function of high-skilled and low-skilled labor, which are supplied by capitalists and 
workers respectively (as in Hornstein et al. (2005)). This differentiation between high-skilled 
and low-skilled labor is driven by differences in labor factor productivities. The government is 
allowed to finance the provision of utility-enhancing public goods by choosing not only the 
level of government spending but also the mix between income and consumption taxes. All 
types of taxes are proportional to their own tax base3. 
Table 1: Consumption Taxes, 2000-2012 
 Effective taxes As a percentage of total taxation 
Belgium 21.5 24.4
Czech Rep. 20.6 30.5
Denmark 32.7 32.1
Germany 19.4 27.4
Estonia 22.8 40.0
Ireland 23.8 36.6
Greece 15.8 36.5
Spain 15.1 26.6
France 19.8 25.5
Italy 17.5 25.2
Cyprus 18.8 39.5
Latvia 18.0 38.7
Lithuania 17.3 38.2
Hungary 26.4 38.0
Netherlands 24.7 29.8
Austria 21.7 28.1
Poland 19.8 37.6
Portugal 18.6 38.2
Slovenia 23.6 36.0
Slovakia 18.9 35.9
Finland 26.7 31.0
Sweden 27.3 27.3
UK 18.2 31.5
Norway 29.4 27.2
Average 22.1 33.2
Source: European Commission / Sample 25 countries 
                                                 
3 We do not allow for the provision of subsidies by the government, since in that case, and given that we 
have a two-agent model, our tax system would become progressive (as in Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). 
We leave this for future work. 
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Our main result is that the introduction of consumption taxes into a model with income taxes 
only generates a tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution. In particular, the economy with 
both income and consumption taxes is more efficient than the economy with income taxes only, 
in the sense that output is higher in the former case. Moreover, both groups of households are 
better off, both in terms of income and welfare, in the economy with income and consumption 
taxes. On the other hand, income inequality increases once consumption taxes are introduced 
in the economy, which simply implies that capitalists benefit more than workers as we move to 
a more efficient economy. Hence, it seems that we are able to confirm the widespread belief 
mentioned above that a switch to a mix of income and consumption taxes creates welfare gains 
for both the economy as a whole and the various social classes individually, but at the cost of 
higher net income inequality. In other words, the introduction of consumption taxes reduces the 
progressivity of the tax system. From a normative point of view, this may also justify the design 
of a set of subsidies policies which will aim to outweigh the regressive effects of the otherwise 
more efficient consumption taxes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the relevant 
literature and explains how the paper differentiates from it. Section 3 describes the economic 
environment and defines, first the Decentralized, and then, the Ramsey, General Equilibrium 
(DGE and RGE respectively). Section 4 discusses the parameter values used in numerical 
solutions, and presents and discusses the numerical results. Section 5 presents the case of a non-
utilitarian government. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Various algebraic details are included in 
an appendix. 
2    Related Literature and How Our Paper is Differentiated 
Our paper belongs to the huge - and still growing - literature on the relationship between fiscal 
policy, and in particular taxation, and macroeconomic outcomes. A key question in this 
literature concerns how changes in the tax mix affect, among others, growth, welfare and 
inequality. 
In particular, the literature on optimal Ramsey taxation studies extensively the role of 
consumption taxes on the grounds of efficiency. It is a common belief that a shift from income 
taxation to consumption taxes raises aggregate efficiency since it induces capital accumulation 
and reduces the so-called under-investment problem due to high capital income taxation. Notice 
that an increase in the income tax rate decreases future consumption relative to current 
consumption. Thus, the choice between income and consumption taxes can be thought of as the 
choice of the optimal taxes on current and future consumption. In this vein, Coleman (2000) 
studies optimal policy in a representative agent model where the government is allowed to 
choose optimally capital income and labour income taxes, as well as taxes on consumption 
expenditure, and finds that there are large welfare gains when the government uses a mix of 
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income and consumption taxes. Zhang et al. (2007) study optimal Ramsey taxation in a 
neoclassical growth, representative agent model in order to examine the superiority, in terms of 
welfare, of consumption taxes relative to income taxes. Particularly, they choose optimally a 
mix of fiscal instruments that consists of capital income, labour income and consumption taxes 
as well as subsidies on net investment. Their main findings are that: (a) the government should 
tax leisure and private consumption at the same rate and should subsidize net investment at the 
same rate with capital income taxation, (b) the tax rate on capital should be higher than that on 
labour so as to increase labour and reduce leisure, and (c) all taxes and subsidies should be 
constant over time, except from the capital income tax rate which can differ in the initial period. 
In the same context, Motta and Rossi (2013) study optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a new 
Keynesian representative agent model with public debt and examine how the Ramsey policy 
changes when the government chooses optimally labour income taxes and consumption taxes. 
They show that the introduction of consumption taxes generates substantial welfare gains which 
are not limited to the steady state but also are evident in the dynamic stochastic equilibrium. 
Moreover, the optimal size of the provided public services is remarkably higher in the presence 
of consumption taxes. 
In addition to the above, the literature on endogenous growth models has investigated 
extensively the effects of both income and consumption taxes on economic growth. For 
instance, Barro (1990) incorporates a public sector into a simple representative agent model of 
endogenous growth, in which, the engine of growth is productive public expenditures. The aim 
is to show, among others, how the externalities associated with public expenditures and income 
taxes affect negatively savings and economic growth. Also, King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo 
(1991), Pecorino (1993) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995), all within a representative consumer 
setup, show that income taxes are in general growth reducing. On the other hand, the impact of 
consumption taxes on growth is ambiguous and depends on model specifications. Milesi-
Ferretti and Roubini (1998), using a representative agent model, examine the macroeconomic 
effects of taxes on capital income, labour income and consumption spending on economic 
growth and aggregate welfare. In their model, the engine of growth is the accumulation of 
human and physical capital. In particular, they show that the effects of the different taxes on 
economic growth depend crucially on the specification of leisure and the structure as well as 
the tax treatment of the human capital accumulation sector. Taxes on capital and labour income 
have a negative effect on growth. Also, consumption taxes hurt long-term growth, when 
government spending as a fraction of output is constant and, thus, the revenues raised due to 
the presence of the consumption tax are rebated in a lump sum way to consumers. As a result, 
the effect on labour supply is negative and economic growth decreases. Following Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1993), where the optimal tax mix consists in setting all taxes equal to zero 
in the long run and accumulating government budget surpluses in order to finance future 
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government spending through the returns of its assets, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) focus 
on the growth maximizing tax mix in the long run rather than on welfare maximizing tax policy.  
For reasons of simplification, they assume that labour is inelastically supplied and, thus, 
consumption tax has no impact on economic growth and limit their analysis to the study of the 
optimal structure of taxation between human and physical capital taxation. On the contrary, 
Rebelo (1991) claims that changes in consumption taxes do not affect growth if government 
spending is allowed to change parallel to consumption taxes. This happens because the extra 
tax revenues due to an increase in the consumption tax rate are not rebated to consumers and 
the income and substitution effects of the consumption tax leave unaffected labour supply and, 
thus, growth. 
Therefore, the main lesson derived from most of the above studies that use representative 
agent models in order to investigate the implications of the use of income and consumption 
taxes for the macroeconomy, is that consumption taxes are a less distortive policy instrument 
relative to income taxes, and, thus, are good on the grounds of efficiency. This conclusion seems 
to be in accordance with what most people tend to believe and may explain the popularity of 
consumption taxes relative to income taxes as a tax policy instrument. 
However, and leaving aside efficiency issues, it is also believed that the use of consumption 
taxes increases inequality by hurting the poor people. Hence, it is also crucial to study the 
implications of the use of consumption taxes for the distribution of income. This extremely 
interesting and important question, regarding the distributional implications of the consumption 
tax rates, has paradoxically attracted very limited attention by the researchers. Few notable 
exceptions include, for instance, Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008), Correia (2010), and Krusell 
et al. (1996), all of whom however, focus on exogenous tax policy systems and reforms. 
In particular, Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008) study the effects of exogenous changes in 
capital, labour and consumption taxes on the wealth distribution in a model in which agents 
differ in initial capital endowments and the labour supply is endogenously determined. Their 
main result is that exogenous tax changes that reduce the labour supply not only decrease output 
but also decrease after tax income inequality. Moreover, the higher the consumption tax rate 
the smaller the decrease in output and inequality. On the other hand, Correia (2010) uses a 
model in which she allows for heterogeneity across agents and shows that the exogenous 
substitution of income taxes with a flat consumption tax rate increases aggregate efficiency and 
reduces income inequality. However, this occurs due to the presence of nondiscriminatory 
lump-sum transfers that increase the progressivity of the tax system. This in turn more than 
outweighs the regressive consequences of the use of consumption taxes. Finally, Krusell et al. 
(1996) study the efficiency and distributional effects of an exogenous switch from an income 
tax to a consumption tax using a neoclassical growth model in which political-equilibrium 
theory is applied. Heterogeneity across agents is based on their wealth holdings and/or labour 
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productivity. They examine whether an economy with consumption taxes only is superior to 
the same economy with income taxes only, when government's outlays are used for 
redistribution through transfers. They find that income taxes are generally a better policy 
instrument than consumption taxes in the sense that the use of more distortionary taxes results 
in higher welfare, since they reduce the level of government activity. On the other hand, tax 
systems with both income and consumption taxes are better relative to one-tax systems since 
the government has at its disposal more policy instruments. Moreover, they find that when the 
aim of the government is to finance the provision of public goods and not to provide any 
transfers to agents, then less distortionary taxes are superior. Concerning the distributional 
implications of the aforementioned tax changes Krussell et al. find that only very rarely the 
median agent improves her welfare after a change in the tax mix (for example, when the 
economy switches from a one tax-system to a two-tax system, the median agent gains whereas 
the rest - those having the same labor efficiency with the median agent but different non-human 
wealth - lose). 
Therefore, our paper differs to the existing relevant literature, discussed briefly above, in 
that at the same time, first, we introduce consumption taxes in an otherwise standard 
neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents and income taxes only, and second, we 
focus on optimal Ramsey policies. In other words, by combining all these elements, our paper 
somehow generalizes the relevant literature, which so far had given emphasis to specific aspects 
of this problem ignoring at the same time other important dimensions. This more generalized 
setup not only allows us to investigate the properties of optimal taxation once consumption 
taxes are introduced, but also explore its aggregate and distributional implications of this richer 
menu of tax policies. Namely, we show that in such a setup, the introduction of optimally 
chosen consumption taxes in an economy with income taxes only, implies substantial aggregate 
output and welfare gains, thus making all agents better off relative to the case in which public 
spending is financed by income taxes only. However, in the absence of ex-post redistributive 
schemes, net income inequality increases in the sense that capitalists benefit more relative to 
workers by the introduction of consumption taxes. Moreover, and since our results are 
numerical, we should mention that they do not depend on whether the government is utilitarian 
or not, and are relatively robust to various parameter changes.  
In summary, this is a paper that focuses on both efficiency and distributional issues in the 
sense that it studies the implications of the use of less distorting policy instruments, i.e. 
consumption taxes, for both the economy as a whole and the distribution of income among 
capital owners and workers. Obviously, from this perspective, it should be considered as a 
positive exercise which does not provide normative suggestions on how policy should deal with 
the unequal distribution of income.  
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3    The Economy 
3.1     Description of the Model 
The setup is a two-period deterministic version of the standard neoclassical growth model 
comprised of households, firms and a government. This model is extended to allow for 
heterogeneity among agents. In particular, the private sector consists of two groups of 
households that are assumed to differ in capital holdings and labor productivity. Following Judd 
(1985) and Lansing (1999), capital is in the hands of a small group of agents, called capitalists, 
while workers, who, by assumption, form the majority in our economy, are not allowed to make 
savings4. Also, as in Hornstein et al. (2005), the aggregate labor input is a linear function of 
high-skilled and low-skilled labor, for capitalists and workers respectively, with different factor 
productivities. Households derive utility from private consumption, leisure and the provision 
of public goods. For simplicity, we use a logarithmic utility function in which preferences are 
separable in all three components. In the first period, capitalists consume, work and save, while 
workers only consume and work. In the second period both groups of households consume and 
work. In the production sector of the economy, private firms, which are owned to capitalists, 
maximize their profits by using capital and labour inputs to produce a single homogeneous 
good. They produce this good using constant returns to scale production function, which is 
strictly concave, differentiable and strictly increasing in both inputs. There are competitive 
factor markets. Each capitalist owns a firm and, thus, profits, if any, are distributed to capitalists. 
Also, there is private good production in both periods. 
The government needs revenues to provide public goods in both periods5. To finance these 
utility - enhancing public goods, it imposes linear taxes on income and consumption spending. 
For simplicity, we abstract from public debt so the government budget is balanced in each 
period. Policy is chosen optimally. We will examine optimal policy with commitment, the so-
called Ramsey policy, in which policy is chosen once-and-for-all at the beginning of the time 
horizon. Thus, the government will maximize a weighted average of capitalists' and workers' 
                                                 
4 The assumption that workers are not allowed to save is not crucial for the results regarding the efficiency 
gains or losses of the later-discussed tax changes. As far as it concerns the distributional implications 
of the same tax changes, we report that they continue to hold even if workers are allowed to save 
provided that they face a higher - than capitalists - transaction cost for participating at the capital 
market. Results are available upon request. 
5 The simplifying assumption that there is public good provision only in second period is very common 
in the relevant literature (see e.g. Fischer (1980), Persson and Tabellini (1994),(2000) and many others). 
Here, we assume that there are both public good provision and private good production in both periods 
(as in Martin (2010)). 
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welfare by choosing income taxes, consumption taxes, as well as the associated amount of the 
public good. 
Total population size, N, is exogenous and constant. Workers are indexed by the subscript 
ݓ = 1,2, …,ܰ௪ and capitalists by the subscript ݇ = 1,2, . ...ܰ௞. In particular, among N, ܰ௞ <
ܰ  are identical capitalists, while the majority ܰ௪ = ܰ − ܰ௞  and ܰ௪ > ܰ௞  are identical 
workers. There are also ݂ = 1,2, … , ܰ௙private firms where the number of firms, for simplicty, 
equals the number of capitalists, ܰ௞ = ܰ௙. Notice also, that there is no social mobility between 
the two groups. 
3.2 Households as capitalists 
Each capitalist k chooses consumption, ܿ௞,ଵ and ܿ௞,ଶ,  labour effort, ݈௞,ଵ and ݈௞,ଶ, in both periods 
and savings in the first period, ݇௞,ଶ  in order to maximize her two-period lifetime welfare: 
ܷ௞ = ߤଵ log ܿ௞,ଵ + ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௞,ଵ൯ + ߤଷ log ݃ଵ + ߚ[ߤଵ log ܿ௞,ଶ
+ ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯ + ߤଷ log ݃ଶ] 
subject to her two consecutive budget constraints: 
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ + ݇௞,ଶ = (1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଵ + ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯            (1.1) 
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ + ݇௞,ଷ = (1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଶ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯            (1.2) 
where the parameters ߤଵ, ߤଶ, ߤଷ>0 are preference weights, ݎଵ, ݎଶ, ݓଵ௞, ݓଶ௞are the gross returns to 
capital and labour respectively in both periods, 0<β<1 is the discount rate, 0≤δ≤1 is the capital 
depreciation rate and 0≤߬ଵ௬, ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖, ߬ଶ௖<1 are tax rates on income and consumption spending in 
both periods. Notice that capitalists are not allowed to leave bequests and, thus, we set ݇௞,ଷ ≡
0. Since the assumptions we make, regarding the operation of firms (see below), imply zero 
profits in equilibrium, we omit them from the capitalist's budget constraints. 
The first order conditions include the two consecutive budget constraints and the optimality 
conditions with respect to ݈௞,ଵ , ݈௞,ଶ and ݇௞,ଶ: 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௞,ଵ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ                                       (1.3) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௞,ଶ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ                                      (1.4) 
1
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ =
ߚ[1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ]
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ                           (1.5) 
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Note that ݇௞,ଵ is the beginning-of-the-first period capital stock and is predetermined. The first 
two static equations, 1.3 and 1.4, respectively, give the labour-supply decisions for the capitalist 
in each period, whereas the last one, equation 1.5, is the standard Euler equation. 
3.2    Households as Workers 
Each worker w chooses consumption and labour effort in both periods,ܿ௪,ଵ, ܿ௪,ଶ and ݈௪,ଵ, ݈௪,ଶ 
respectively, in order to maximize her two-period lifetime welfare: 
ܷ௪ = ߤଵ log ܿ௪,ଵ + ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௪,ଵ൯ + ߤଷ log ݃ଵ + ߚ[ߤଵ log ܿ௪,ଶ
+ ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௪,ଶ൯ + ߤଷ log ݃ଶ] 
subject to her two consecutive budget constraints: 
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵ = ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ                              (1.6) 
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶ = ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ                              (1.7) 
The first order conditions include the two consecutive budget constraints and the optimality 
conditions with respect to ݈௪,ଵ and ݈௪,ଶ: 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௪,ଵ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵ                                          (1.8) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௪,ଶ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶ                                          (1.9) 
Note that the workers are not allowed to save. The above two static equations, 1.8 and 1.9 
respectively, give the labour-supply decisions for the worker. 
3.3    Firms 
There is production in both periods. There are  ݂ = 1,2, … , ܰ௙  firms owned by capitalists. 
Thus, each capitalist owns a firm and hence ܰ௞ = ܰ௙. Each firm maximizes its profits in each 
period: 
ߎଵ = ݕ௙,ଵ − ݎଵ݇௙,ଵ − ݓଵ௞ ௙݈,ଵ௞ − ݓଵ௪ ௙݈,ଵ௪                       (1.10) 
ߎଶ = ݕ௙,ଶ − ݎଶ݇௙,ଶ − ݓଶ௞݈௙,ଶ௞ − ݓଶ௪݈௙,ଶ௪                          (1.11) 
where output in period 1 and 2 is produced according to the following standard Cobb-Douglas 
production functions: 
ECONOMIDES, RIZOS     Optimal Taxation, Efficiency and Redistribution 
 
 11
ݕ௙,ଵ = ܣ ௙݇,ଵ௔ܮ௙,ଵଵି௔                                                    (1.12) 
ݕ௙,ଶ = ܣ ௙݇,ଶ௔ܮ௙,ଶଵି௔                                                    (1.13) 
where ݇௙,ଵ, ݇௙,ଶ are the capital inputs supplied by capitalists, ܮ௙,ଵ and ܮ௙,ଶ are the aggregate 
effective labour inputs, while A>0 and 0<α<1 are usual technology parameters. 
We assume that capitalists are more skilled than workers, and, therefore, the two types of 
agents face different factor productivities. Thus, as in Hornstein et al. (2005), we generalize the 
production function by disaggregating the contributions to production of the two labour inputs. 
We assume that the aggregate effective labour input ܮ௙,௧ is a weighted linear function of labour 
supplied by high-skilled agents (i.e. capitalists) and labour supplied by low-skilled agents (i.e. 
workers),  ݈௙,௧௞  and ݈௙,௧௪  respectively, where the weights, ܣ௞ and ܣ௪ , reflect the different 
productivities/skills between capitalists and workers, and where it holds that ܣ௞ > ܣ௪: 
ܮ௙,௧ = ܣ௞݈௙,௧௞ + ܣ௪ ௙݈,௧௪  
Thus, the production functions presented in equations 1.12 and 1.13 can be written as: 
ݕ௙,ଵ = ܣ݇௙,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଵ௞ + ܣ௪ ௙݈,ଵ௪ )ଵି௔                                     (1.12’) 
ݕ௙,ଶ = ܣ݇௙,ଶ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଶ௞ + ܣ௪ ௙݈,ଶ௪ )ଵି௔                                     (1.13’) 
where ݇௙,ଵ, ݇௙,ଶ are the capital inputs, ݈௙,ଵ௞ , ݈௙,ଶ௞ are the labour inputs supplied by capitalists and 
௙݈,ଵ௪ , ݈௙,ଶ௪  are the labour inputs supplied by workers. 
   The first order conditions of the above profit maximization problems with respect to ௙݇,ଵ, 
௙݈,ଵ௞ , ݈௙,ଵ௪ , ݇௙,ଶ, ݈௙,ଶ௞  and ݈௙,ଶ௪  are respectively: 
ݎଵ = ܽܣ݇௙,ଵ௔ିଵ(ܣ௞ ௙݈,ଵ௞ + ܣ௪ ௙݈,ଵ௪ )ଵି௔                                     (1.14) 
ݓଵ௞ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௙,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଵ௞ + ܣ௪݈௙,ଵ௪ )ି௔                               (1.15) 
ݓଵ௪ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௙,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଵ௞ + ܣ௪݈௙,ଵ௪ )ି௔                               (1.16) 
ݎଶ = ܽܣ ௙݇,ଶ௔ିଵ(ܣ௞ ௙݈,ଶ௞ + ܣ௪ ௙݈,ଶ௪ )ଵି௔                                     (1.17) 
ݓଶ௞ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௙,ଶ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଶ௞ + ܣ௪݈௙,ଶ௪ )ି௔                               (1.18) 
ݓଶ௪ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௙,ଶ௔(ܣ௞݈௙,ଶ௞ + ܣ௪݈௙,ଶ௪ )ି௔                               (1.19) 
where, since ܣ௞ > ܣ௪, ݓଵ௞ > ݓଵ௪ and ݓଶ௞ > ݓଶ௪. 
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3.4   Government 
The government operates in each period. It needs revenues to provide utility-enhancing public 
goods and, therefore, we assume that it finances the provision of these public goods by a mix 
of linear income and consumption taxes, which are both proportional to their own tax base. 
The two consecutive government budget constraints, written in aggregate terms, are: 
ܩଵ = ܰ௞ൣ߬ଵ௬൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯ + ߬ଵ௖ܿ௞,ଵ൧ + ܰ௪[߬ଵ௬ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ + ߬ଵ௖ܿ௪,ଵ]          (1.20) 
ܩଶ = ܰ௞ൣ߬ଶ௬൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ + ߬ଶ௖ܿ௞,ଶ൧ + ܰ௪[߬ଶ௬ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ + ߬ଶ௖ܿ௪,ଶ]          (1.21) 
where ܩ௧ ≡ ܰ݃௧ is the total provision of the public good in each period t. 
3.5   Market clearing Conditions 
Each capitalist owns a firm. Hence, it holds that  ܰ௞ = ܰ௙ = ܰ − ܰ௪. It is convenient to 
define the population shares of the two groups as ݊௞ = ேೖே  and ݊௪ =
ேೢ
ே = 1 − ݊௞. The market 
clearing conditions for the capital market are: 
 
ܰ௙݇௙,ଵ = ܰ௞݇௞,ଵ ⇔  ௙݇,ଵ = ݇௞,ଵ 
ܰ௙݇௙,ଶ = ܰ௞݇௞,ଶ ⇔  ௙݇,ଶ = ݇௞,ଶ 
The labour market clearing conditions imply that labour demand equals labour supply. Hence 
the labour market clearing conditions are: 
ܰ௙݈௙,ଵ௞ = ܰ௞݈௞,ଵ  ⇔  ݈௙,ଵ௞ = ݈௞,ଵ 
ܰ௙݈௙,ଶ௞ = ܰ௞݈௞,ଶ  ⇔  ݈௙,ଶ௞ = ݈௞,ଶ 
ܰ௙݈௙,ଵ௪ = ܰ௪݈௪,ଵ  ⇔  ݊௞݈௙,ଵ௪ = ݊௪݈௪,ଵ  ⇔  ݈௙,ଵ௪ =
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଵ 
ܰ௙݈௙,ଶ௪ = ܰ௪݈௪,ଶ  ⇔  ݊௞݈௙,ଶ௪ = ݊௪݈௪,ଶ  ⇔  ݈௙,ଶ௪ =
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ 
3.6    Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (for given policy) 
Now we can define the Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) for any feasible policy. 
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Definition 1: (Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium). Given the paths of the independent 
policy instruments{߬௧௬, ߬௧௖, ݃௧}௧ୀଵ,ଶ a decentralized equilibrium is defined to be a sequence 
of allocations {ܿ௞,௧, ݈௞,௧, ݇௞,௧ାଵ} ௧ୀଵ,ଶ  for the capitalist and {ܿ௪,௧, ݈௪,௧}௧ୀଵ,ଶ for the worker 
and prices{ݎ௧, ݓ௧௞, ݓ௧௪}௧ୀଵ,ଶ , such that households maximize utility and firms maximize 
profits given prices and economic policy, all markets clear and all constraints are satisfied. 
In the DCE, both types of households (capitalists and workers) maximize lifetime utility, firms 
maximize profits, all constraints (including the government's budget constraint) are satisfied 
and all markets clear. This DCE is summarized by the following equations. Notice that all 
quantities are in per capita terms: 
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ + ݇௞,ଶ = (1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଵ + ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯         (2.1) 
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ = (1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଶ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯                 (2.2) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௞,ଵ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ                                             (2.3) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௞,ଶ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ                                            (2.4) 
1
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ =
ߚ[1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ]
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ                             (2.5) 
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵ = ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ                                        (2.6) 
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶ = ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ                                        (2.7) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௪,ଵ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪
(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵ                                          (2.8) 
ߤଶ
(1 − ݈௪,ଶ) =
ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪
(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶ                                          (2.9) 
݃ଵ = ݊௞߬ଵ௬൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯ + ݊௪߬ଵ௬ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ + ߬ଵ௖(݊௞ܿ௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଵ)      (2.10) 
݃ଶ = ݊௞߬ଶ௬൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ + ݊௪߬ଶ௬ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ + ߬ଶ௖(݊௞ܿ௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଶ)        (2.11) 
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where in the above equations we use: 
݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ = ܣ(݊௞݇௞,ଵ)௔(݊௞ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܣ௪݈௪,ଵ)ଵି௔ 
݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ = ܣ(݊௞݇௞,ଶ)௔(݊௞ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܣ௪݈௪,ଶ)ଵି௔ 
ݎଵ = ܽܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ିଵ(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ଵି௔ 
ݓଵ௞ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ି௔ 
ݓଵ௪ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ି௔ 
ݎଶ = ܽܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ(ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ)ଵି௔ 
ݓଶ௞ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ)ି௔ 
ݓଶ௪ = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ)ି௔ 
Instead of the equations 2.1-2.2 (capitalist's budget constraints), we can use the two resource 
constraints of the economy which are given below: 
݊௞ܿ௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଵ + ݊௞݇௞,ଶ − (1 − ߜ)݊௞݇௞,ଵ + ݃ଵ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ                   (2.12)    
݊௞ܿ௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଶ − (1 − ߜ)݊௞݇௞,ଶ + ݃ଶ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ                         (2.13) 
Hence, we end up with a system of 11 equations (2.1-2.11 or 2.3-2.13) in 9 endogenous 
variables: {ܿ௞,ଵ, ܿ௞,ଶ, ݇௞,ଶ, ݈௞,ଵ, ݈௞,ଶ, ܿ௪,ଵ, ܿ௪,ଶ, ݈௪,ଵ, ݈௪,ଶ } and 2 of the policy instruments {݃ଵ, ݃ଶ} 
which adjust to satisfy the two consecutive government's budget constraints. This is for any tax 
policy {߬ଵ௬, ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖ ߬ଶ௖}. In the case of Ramsey policy the above equations will serve as the 
constraints to the Ramsey government when the latter chooses the policy instruments in the 
beginning of the time horizon subject to the above equations. Irrespectively of how policy is 
chosen below we need to make sure that the DCE system delivers a meaningful numerical 
solution. We check this in subsection 5.1. 
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3.7    Ramsey General Equilibrium 
We will consider optimal policy with commitment. In this case, the so-called Ramsey General 
Equilibrium, policy is chosen once-and-for-all at the beginning of the time horizon before 
private agents make their choices. Notice that the government is benevolent and, thus, 
maximizes a weighted average of the utilities of the two groups of households, taking into 
account the DCE equations. The problem is solved by backward induction. This means that we 
first solve the private agents' problem and then we solve for optimal policy. 
We now define the Ramsey equilibrium, i.e. when the policy-maker is able to commit to future 
policies. 
Definition 2: (Ramsey General Equilibrium). A Ramsey General Equilibrium is a sequence of 
government policies{߬௧௬, ߬௧௖, ݃௧}௧ୀଵ,ଶ, allocations {ܿ௞,௧, ݈௞,௧, ݇௞,௧ାଵ} ௧ୀଵ,ଶ for the capitalist and 
allocations {ܿ௪,௧, ݈௪,௧}௧ୀଵ,ଶ for the worker which solve the following maximization problem: 
max
{ఛ೟೤,ఛ೟೎,௚೟}೟సభ,మ
[(1 − ߛ)ܷ௞ + ߛܷ௪] 
subject to the DCE equations and taking as given the beginning of the first period capital stock, 
݇௞,ଵ. 
Notice that, in order to make the Ramsey policy problem non-trivial, we impose a restriction 
on the first-period income tax rate ߬ଵ௬, for example by taking it as given at a small number (for 
instance, 0.15 at our numerical solution - see also below). This approach rules out taxing heavily 
the initial capital stock which would be equivalent to a non-distorting lump-sum tax, since ݇௞,ଵ 
is in fixed supply. 
We assume commitment technologies, i.e. the government can commit itself to the policies 
that will be in place arbitrarily into the second period. The sequence of time is as follows. Policy 
is chosen once-and-for-all in the beginning of period 1 before any private decisions are made. 
We solve the problem by backward induction. This means that the agents first solve their 
optimization problems for given policy and then the government chooses the policy 
instruments ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖ ߬ଶ௖, ଵ݃, ݃ଶ to maximize a weighted average of the utility of the two agents, 
(1 − ߛ) ௞ܷ + ߛܷ௪  subject to the DCE equations derived earlier, where the given political 
preferences 0 ≤ ߛ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1 − ߛ ≤ 1 measure respectively the influence of the two social 
classes, workers and capitalists, in the policy setting process. 
 
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 1-43 
 16
The Lagrangian equation of the Ramsey government's optimization problem is: 
 
ܮ = (1 − ߛ)൛ߤଵ log ܿ௞,ଵ + ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௞,ଵ൯ + ߚൣߤଵ log ܿ௞,ଶ + ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯൧ൟ
+  ߛ{ߤଵ log ܿ௪,ଵ
+ ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௪,ଵ൯ + ߚൣߤଵ log ܿ௪,ଶ + ߤଶ log൫1 − ݈௪,ଶ൯]}
+ ߤଷ log{ ݊௞߬ଵ௬൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯ + ݊௪߬ଵ௬ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ
+ ߬ଵ௖൫݊௞ܿ௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଵ൯ൟ
+ ߚߤଷ log൛݊௞߬ଶ௬൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ + ݊௪߬ଶ௬ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ
+ ߬ଶ௖൫݊௞ܿ௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଶ൯ൟ
+ ߣଵ൛(1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଵ + ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯ − (1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ + ݇௞,ଶൟ
+ ߚߣଶ൛(1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଶ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶൟ
+ ߣଷ൛ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞൫1 − ݈௞,ଵ൯ − ߤଶ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵൟ
+ ߚߣସ൛ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯ − ߤଶ(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶൟ
+ ߣହ൛ߚ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵൣ1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ൧ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶൟ
+ ߣ଺൛൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ − (1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵൟ
+ ߚߣ଻൛൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶൟ
+ ߣ଼ ቊܽܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ൰
ଵି௔
− ݎଵቋ
+ ߚߣଽ ቊܽܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ଵି௔
− ݎଶቋ
+ ߣଵ଴ ቊ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ൰
ି௔
− ݓଵ௞ቋ
+ ߚߣଵଵ ቊ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ି௔
− ݓଶ௞ቋ
+ ߣଵଶ ቊ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ൰
ି௔
− ݓଵ௪ቋ
+ ߚߣଵଷ{(1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ି௔
− ݓଶ௪} 
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That is, we follow the dual approach6 to the Ramsey policy problem, where the government re-
chooses the allocations and the policy variables subject to the DCE. The first-order conditions 
of the above maximization problem are presented in detail at the appendix. Since it is 
impossible to get an analytical solution of the Ramsey General Equilibrium, we resort to 
numerical simulations which are presented in the next section. 
4    Numerical Results 
4.1 Parameterization 
Since the above described general equilibrium cannot be solved analytically, we present 
numerical solutions using common parameter values. Table 2 below reports the baseline 
parameter values for technology and preference, as well as the values of the exogenous policy 
instruments. 
Let us discuss, briefly, the parameter values summarized in Table 2. Regarding those 
parameters related to technology and preference, we use conventional values used by 
thebusiness cycle literature (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al., 2011, for a DSGE model with tax 
reforms calibrated to the UK economy). Notice here that when we do not have a priori 
 
Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Value Definition
ܽ 0.3 Share of private capital income to total output 
ߤଵ 0.3 Weight given to private consumption 
ߤଶ 0.5 Weight given to leisure 
ߤଷ 0.2 Weight given to public consumption 
ܣ 1 Total factor productivity (TFP) 
ܣ఑ 5 TFP for capitalist’s productivity 
ܣ௪ 1 TFP's for worker’s productivity 
ߜ 0.12 Depreciation rate of private capital 
ߚ 0.9 Discount rate 
݊௞ 0.3 Capitalists’ population share 
݊௪ 0.7 Workers’ population share 
ߛ 0.7 Weight given to workers' welfare 
݇௞,ଵ 0.05 Initial capital stock 
߬ଵ௬ 0.15 1st period income tax rate 
 
                                                 
6 We use the dual approach; in contrast to the primal where all prices and taxes are eliminated so that the 
government is thought of as directly choosing a feasible allocation (see also Economides et al. (2008)). 
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information about a parameter value, or when different authors use different values, we 
experiment with a range of values. 
Specifically, in the private production function, in equations (1.12) and (1.13), the Cobb-
Douglas exponent on employment, 1 − ߙ, is equal to the labour share of income, 0.7, which is 
close to the value used by Angelopoulos et al. (2011); the rest, a, is the exponent on capital. 
The scale parameter in the production function, ܣ, is set at 1. Also, we set ܣ௞ = 5 and ܣ௪ = 1, 
since capitalists are assumed to be more skilled than workers and, therefore, face higher 
productivity for their labour supply, resulting, in turn, in higher wages. This assumption not 
only allows us to get a solution regarding labour supply of capitalists within accepted range but 
also is in line with a strand of literature that has examined the occupational choice of economic 
agents, usually focusing on the distinction between entrepreneurs and workers and its 
implications for skill acquisition (see, e.g., Quadrini 2000; Matsuyama 2006; Kambourov and 
Manovskii 2009)7. The time preference rate, ߚ, is set at 0.9. For the weights given by the 
households to private consumption, leisure and public consumption respectively, we assume 
that μ₁ = 0.3, ߤ₂ = 0.5 and ߤ₃ = 0.2. The latter value is close to the one used by similar 
studies, whereas the weights assigned to private consumption and leisure imply hours of work 
within usual ranges. Finally, the capital depreciation rate, ߜ, is set at 0.12. 
Regarding the capitalists' and workers' population shares in total population we set them to 
be 0.3 and 0.7 respectively. Notice that ߛ is the weight given by the government to worker's 
welfare. Thus, when we assume that the government is utilitarian, the policy is chosen by a 
government that attaches weights ߛ and (1 − ߛ) to the utility of workers and capitalists equal 
to their population shares (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al., 2011). Therefore, we set ߛ = ݊௪ and 
(1 − ߛ) = ݊௞. 8 Furthermore, the first-period capital stock ݇௞,ଵ is exogenously given and set at 
0.05; we report that our results are robust to changes in the value of the initial capital stock. 
Finally, as already said in the previous section, in order to make the Ramsey policy problem 
non-trivial, we impose a restriction on the first-period income tax rate 
߬ଵ௬, by taking it as given at a small number. Otherwise, the government would choose to tax 
heavily the initial capital stock which would be equivalent to a non-distorting lump-sum tax, 
since ݇௞,ଵ is in fixed supply. Therefore, in our specific numerical simulations we have set the 
value of ߬ଵ௬ at 0.15; regarding this parameter value see also the discussion in footnote 13. 
                                                 
7 Notice that our results are robust to changes in these parameter values. 
8 According to Grossman and Helpman (1996), capitalists seem to have more power in the government 
decision process. Also, as Angelopoulos et al. (2011) claim policies are chosen by governments that 
may have specific ideological preferences over groups or are preferred by the majority of the voters. 
Thus, in reality, the governments are not utilitarian. Therefore, it is useful to examine the effects of the 
introduction of consumption taxes on redistributive incentives in an economic environment where the 
government cares more or less for one specific group. We check this case in section 6. 
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4.2   Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms When Policy is Exogenous 
Before we study optimal policy, it is useful to study some exogenous policy reforms. In 
particular, we examine a revenue-neutral change in the second-period income tax rate ߬ଶ௬ and 
the impact of this reform on efficiency and redistribution incentives. Initially, we assume that 
߬ଵ௬ = 0.15, ߬ଶ௬ = 0.3 and ߬ଵ௖ =  ߬ଶ௖ = 0.2 whereas ݃₁, ݃₂ are residually determined by the two 
consecutive government's budget constraints.9 Next, we change the second-period income tax 
rate ߬ଶ௬  and, at the same time, we keep the total tax revenues constant. As a result, the 
consumption taxes are determined residually by the Tax Revenue equation (in each period), 
which is given by: 
ܴ࢚ܶ = ݊௞߬௧௬൫ݎ௧݇௞,௧ + ݓ௧௞݈௞,௧ + ߎ௧൯ + ݊௪߬௧௬ݓ௧௪݈௪,௧ + ߬௧௖(݊௞ܿ௞,௧ + ݊௪ܿ௪,௧) 
The quantitative and qualitative effects of this tax revenue-neutral reform are presented in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (see also Figure 1 in the appendix). In particular, a decrease in second-period 
income tax rate ߬ଶ௬ results in an increase in the second-period consumption tax rate. Hence, 
income taxes are substituted by higher consumption taxes, since the government has to generate 
the required revenues to finance the provision of public goods, which, as said, is held constant. 
Moreover, savings ݇௞,ଶ are lower. This happens because the savings decision is made in the 
first period only, where the income tax rate is given. Thus, the introduction of a positive 
consumption tax in the first period reduces the disposable income of the capitalists and, thus, 
private consumption and savings. On the other hand, there is a positive effect on savings from 
the decrease in the second-period income tax rate. However, as the former effect dominates the 
latter effect, the net effect is a lower capital stock in the second period10. Also, labour supply 
݈௞,ଶ  increases when second-period income tax falls and consumption tax rises, resulting in 
higher output and welfare in the economy. Thus, the economy is more efficient as income taxes 
are substituted by consumption taxes. Also, at an individual level, workers can benefit from a 
more efficient economy, as can be seen in Table 3.2, where ܷ௪ has increased. On the other 
                                                 
9 The values that have been assigned to ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖ and ߬ଶ௖ are close to OECD averages. 
10 Although we have not managed to establish theoretically why this is the case, we should report that we 
have experimented with changes in a wide range of parameter values to which this specific result seems 
to be robust. An exception is the value of the initial income tax rate. In particular, as the initial income 
tax rate, ߬ଵ௬, increases, ceteris paribus, it is possible that the positive effect, coming from the lower 
second period income tax rate, dominates the negative effect, coming from the first period positive 
consumption tax rate, and thereby savings, ݇₂, increase. This is a rather expected result, since the higher 
the initial income tax rate the lower the need for the government to raise tax revenues through the 
endogenously determined tax instruments and thereby the less it relies on the use of consumption tax 
rates which affect negatively - in the first period, through the reduction in the disposable net income - 
the level of savings, ݇₂. We would like to thank a referee for highlighting this point. 
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hand, the welfare of the capitalists ௞ܷ does not behave monotonically. In particular, it initially 
increases and then it decreases as ߬ଶ௬ falls. This happens because high consumption taxes hurt 
capitalists more. Net income inequality11 decreases in the first-period (where the first-period 
income tax rate is given), while in the second period, net income inequality increases, implying 
that capitalists' net income ݕଶ௞ increases more than workers' net income ݕଶ௪. Thus, although the 
substitution of income taxes with consumption taxes is Pareto improving, the associated 
efficiency gains come at the cost of higher income inequality. This means that there is a tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity. 
The above analysis is for given policy. Next, we move to optimal policy with commitment, 
the so-called Ramsey equilibrium, in which second-best policy is optimally chosen by a 
benevolent Ramsey government. 
 
Table 3.1 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
 ߬ଶ௬ = 0.4 Benchmark ߬ଶ௬ = 0.2 ߬ଶ௬ = 0.1 
Allocations  
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.2970 0.3000 0.3022 0.3040 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.5066 0.5077 0.5074 0.5065 
݇௞,ଶ 0.2050 0.1967 0.1903 0.1852 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3462 0.3414 0.3378 0.3349 
݈௞,ଶ 0.1780 0.1908 0.2002 0.2074 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0568 0.0569 0.0570 0.0571 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0770 0.0784 0.0793 0.0799 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
ݕ௙,ଵ 0.7959 0.7908 0.7869 0.7838 
ݕ௙,ଶ 0.7329 0.7492 0.7601 0.7677 
ଵܻ 0.2388 0.2372 0.2361 0.2351 
ଶܻ 0.2199 0.2248 0.2280 0.2303 
ܥଵ
ଵܻ
 0.5397 0.5474 0.5532 0.5579 
ܥଶ
ଶܻ
 0.9366 0.9220 0.9109 0.9025 
 
 
                                                 
11 Notice that net income is defined as: ݕ௧௞ ≡ (1 − ߬௧௬)(ݎ௧݇௞,௧ + ݓ௧௞݈௞,௧) − ߬௧௖ܿ௞,௧ for each capitalist and 
ݕ௧௪ ≡ (1 − ߬௧௬)(ݓ௧௪݈௪,௧) − ߬௧௖ܿ௪,௧ for each worker. 
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Table 3.2: Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
 ߬ଶ௬ = 0.4 Benchmark ߬ଶ௬ = 0.2 ߬ଶ௬ = 0.1 
Policy  
߬ଵ௖ 0.2001 0.2(given) 0.2006 0.2007 
߬ଶ௖ 0.0717 0.2(given) 0.3329 0.4682 
ଵ݃ 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 
݃ଶ 0.1258 0.1258 0.1258 0.1258 
ଵ݃
ଵܻ
 0.2580 0.2595 0.2609 0.2620 
݃ଶ
ଶܻ
 0.5722 0.5595 0.5517 0.5462 
TR1 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 
TR2 0.1258 0.1258 0.1258 0.1258 
Welfare     
௞ܷ -1.7790 -1.7790 -1.7794 -1.7800 
ܷ௪ -2.9297 -2.9242 -2.9206 -2.9182 
ܷ -2.5845 -2.5807 -2.5782 -2.5767 
Net income     
ݕଵ௞  0.4581 0.4527 0.4485 0.4452 
ݕଵ௪ 0.0568 0.0569 0.0570 0.0571 
ݕଶ௞  0.3262 0.3347 0.3399 0.3435 
ݕଶ௪ 0.0770 0.0784 0.0793 0.0799 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
8.0664 7.9499 7.8621 7.7924 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
4.2340 4.2668 4.2866 4.3002 
 
4.3    Optimal Policy with Commitment / Ramsey General Equilibrium 
4.3.1    Results from the Representative Agent Model 
It is useful for what follows to present the numerical results from the respective representative 
agent model, using the same benchmark parameter values as above.12 Thus, we work as follows: 
Initially, we solve for the commitment equilibrium when the government chooses optimally 
only the second-period income tax rate. Hence, the government chooses ߬ଶ௬,݃₁, ݃₂ to maximize 
                                                 
12 Notice that, in this case, we simply assume that ݊௞ = 1, ݊௪ = 0 and ߛ = 0. 
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the utility of the representative agent subject to the decentralized competitive equilibrium, when 
we exogenously set ߬ଵ௖ =  ߬ଶ௖ = 0. This serves as our benchmark regime. Next, we assume that 
the government can choose optimally both income and consumption taxes and we solve for two 
different cases. In the first regime, we introduce a flat consumption tax ߬௖ = ߬ଵ௖ =  ߬ଶ௖ that is 
common in both periods and the government chooses optimally ߬ଶ௬,݃₁, ݃₂,߬௖. In the second 
regime, we assume that the government chooses optimally, among others, two different 
consumption taxes, one in each period, ߬ଵ௖ ≠  ߬ଶ௖. A numerical solution for these regimes is 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
The main results are the following: There are welfare gains when the government is able to 
choose optimally both income and consumption taxes. For instance, welfare ܷ and second-
period output ݕ௙,ଶ are higher with the introduction of consumption taxes. Moreover, the second-
period net income ܻ₂ⁿ of the representative household increases. This happens because the 
government finds it optimal to raise revenues by setting a positive consumption tax rate. This, 
ceteris paribus, causes an increase in total tax revenues, creating a fiscal space which allows for 
a decrease in the more distorting income tax rate in the second period. 
 
Table 4.1: Ramsey Equilibrium  / Representative Agent
 
 Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠ ߬ଶ௖ 
Allocations  
ܿଵ 0.1317 0.0977 0.0996 
ܿଶ 0.1372 0.1281 0.1263 
݇ଶ 0.0759 0.0643 0.0623 
݈ଵ 0.3429 0.3252 0.3222 
݈ଶ 0.1773 0.2237 0.2308 
ݎଵ 1.1547 1.1127 1.1055 
ݎଶ 0.5431 0.7183 0.7506 
ݓଵ 0.3929 0.3992 0.4003 
ݓଶ 0.5428 0.4815 0.4725 
ݕ௙,ଵ 0.1925 0.1854 0.1843 
ݕ௙,ଶ 0.1375 0.1539 0.1558 
ܥଵ
ଵܻ
 0.6841 0.5270 0.5405 
ܥଶ
ଶܻ
 0.9983 0.8327 0.8110 
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Table 4.2:  Ramsey Equilibrium  / Representative Agent
 Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠  ߬ଶ௖ 
Policy 
instruments 
   
߬ଶ௬ 0.4878 0.1970 0.1208 
߬ଵ௖ - - 0.3892 
߬ଶ௖ - - 0.5177 
߬௖ - 0.4056 - 
ଵ݃ 0.0289 0.0675 0.0664 
݃ଶ 0.0671 0.0823 0.0842 
ଵ݃
ଵܻ
 0.1500 0.3638 0.3604 
݃ଶ
ଶܻ
 0.4878 0.5348 0.5407 
Welfare outcome  
ܷ -2.6377 -2.5519 -2.5509 
Net income  
ଵܻ௡ 0.1636 0.1180 0.1179 
ଶܻ௡ 0.0704 0.0716 0.0715 
 
Also, consumption is lower in both periods due to the high consumption taxes while the lower 
second-period income tax rate triggers an increase in the second-period labour supply, which, 
in turn, increases second-period output ݕ௙,ଶ. Savings ݇₂ are lower with the introduction of the 
consumption taxes, although the second-period income tax rate ߬ଶ௬ decreases. This happens 
because the savings decision about ݇₂ is made in the first period, where the income tax rate is 
given and equal to 0.15. The introduction of a consumption tax in the first period (or a flat 
consumption tax that affects both periods) reduces the household's first-period disposable 
income, which in turn reduces savings ݇₂ and consumption ܿ₁. Thus, there are two opposite 
effects on savings, where the negative effect from the introduction of the consumption tax rate 
in the first-period dominates the positive effect from the reduction of the second-period income 
tax rate.13 
To sum up, the economy with income and consumption taxes is more efficient than the 
economy without consumption taxes. In other words, a mix of income and consumption taxes 
increases welfare and output. Next, we move to the heterogeneous agents’ case so as to 
investigate the distributional implications of the introduction of consumption taxes. 
                                                 
13 See footnote 10. 
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4.3.2     Results when Heterogeneity is Allowed 
In this section, our aim is to highlight the aggregate and distributional implications of 
introducing consumption taxes into a model with income taxes only and heterogeneous agents, 
when the government chooses optimally the mix of income and consumption taxes. Thus, we 
choose to work as follows. First, we solve for the Ramsey/commitment equilibrium when the 
government chooses optimally the second-period income tax rate only. Thus, the government 
chooses ߬ଶ௬,݃₁, ݃₂ to maximize a weighted average of the utilities of the two agents, capitalists 
and workers, subject to the decentralized equilibrium equations, when we exogenously set ߬ଵ௖ =
 ߬ଶ௖ = 0. This serves as our benchmark regime. Next, we assume that the government can 
choose optimally both income and consumption taxes and we solve for two different cases. In 
the first regime, we introduce a flat consumption tax ߬௖ = ߬ଵ௖ =  ߬ଶ௖ that is common for both 
periods and the government chooses optimally ߬ଶ௬,݃₁, ݃₂,߬௖. In the second regime, we assume 
that the government chooses optimally, among others, two different consumption taxes, one in 
each period, ߬ଵ௖ ≠  ߬ଶ௖. A numerical solution for these regimes is presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
below. 
The main results from the comparison of these regimes are as follows: First, the economy 
with the consumption taxes is welfare superior to the economy without (benchmark regime). 
For instance, second-period total output ܻ₂ and aggregate welfare ܷ are now higher and this is 
reasonable since the government has one more policy instrument at its disposal which is less 
distorting relative to income taxes. Second, at an individual level, both capitalists and workers 
are better off and benefit from a more efficient economy. For instance, second-period net 
incomes, ଶܻ௞ and ଶܻ௪, and individual welfares, ܷ௞and ܷ௪, are higher when the government is 
allowed to choose optimally both income and consumption taxes. 
Notice that savings ݇௞,ଶ are lower with the introduction of the consumption taxes. This 
happens because the saving decision is made by the capitalists in the first period, in which the 
income tax rate is given. Thus, high positive consumption taxes in the first-period hurt 
substantially the first-period net income of the capitalists, since ߬ଵ௬ is given, and, in turn, reduce 
savings and private consumption. This negative effect on savings dominates the positive effect 
from the decrease in the second-period income tax rate. Notice here, however, that if we allow 
for a three period economy where in the second period both the beginning-of-period and the 
end-of-period capital stock are endogenously determined, the effect of the introduction of 
consumption taxes on second-period savings݇௞,ଷ is positive. Hence, the capital stock in the 
third period is higher, since the capitalists can benefit from the lower income tax rate in the 
second period. We present the results for this special case in the appendix. 
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Table 5.1: Ramsey Equilibrium  
 Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠ ߬ଶ௖ 
Allocations  
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.3547 0.2604 0..2740 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.5156 0.5014 0.4781 
݇௞,ଶ 0.2093 0.1883 0.1597 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3486 0.3367 0.3206 
݈௞,ଶ 0.1713 0.2030 0.2406 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0681 0.0491 0.0504 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0778 0.0786 0.0787 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
ݎଵ 4.7908 4.7143 4.6104 
ݎଶ 1.3168 1.5072 1.8077 
ݓଵ௞ 1.0675 1.0749 1.0852 
ݓଶ௞ 1.8568 1.7523 1.6210 
ݓଵ௪ 0.2135 0.2150 0.2170 
ݓଶ௪ 0.3714 0.3505 0.3242 
Output  
ݕ௙,ଵ 0.7985 0.7857 0.7684 
ݕ௙,ଶ 0.7235 0.7631 0.7937 
ଵܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ 0.2395 0.2357 0.2305 
ଶܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ 0.2171 0.2289 0.2381 
ܥଵ
ଵܻ
 0.6430 0.4772 0.5096 
ܥଶ
ଶܻ
 0.9634 0.8974 0.8337 
 
Third, for the regime with the flat consumption tax, the government finds it optimal to set ߬ଶ௬ 
at a lower value (0.1645) relative to the case with income taxes only, thereby it chooses to 
substitute partially the more distorting income tax with the less distorting consumption tax. In 
other words, the Ramsey government, by realizing that it has a less distorting policy instrument 
at its disposal, chooses to generate the required revenues to finance the provision of public 
goods by taxing consumption (߬௖ = 0.3964), so as to mitigate the distortionary effects imposed 
on the economy by high income taxation. Also, for the regime with the two different 
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Table 5.2: Ramsey Equilibrium
Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠  ߬ଶ௖ 
Policy instruments  
߬ଶ௬ 0.4416 0.1645 -1.3471 
߬ଵ௖ - - 0.3723 
߬ଶ௖ - - 2.6258 
߬௖ - 0.3964 - 
ଵ݃ 0.0359 0.0799 0.0783 
݃ଶ 0.1217 0.1281 0.1324 ݃ଵ
ଵܻ
 0.1500 0.3391 0.3398 
݃ଶ
ଶܻ
 0.5605 0.5597 0.5558 
Welfare outcome 
ܷ௞ -1.8331 -1.7725 -1.7782 
ܷ௪ -2.9867 -2.9126 -2.9025 
ܷ -2.6406 -2.5706 -2.5652 
Income Inequality 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
7.6397 8.2479 7.7303 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
4.2620 4.2682 4.2894 
ݕଵ௞  0.5199 0.4048 0.3897 
ݕଵ௪  0.0681 0.0491 0.0504 
ݕଶ௞  0.3314 0.3356 0.3376 
ݕଶ௪  0.0778 0.0786 0.0787 
 
 
 consumption taxes, the government chooses a positive consumption tax in the first period 
(߬ଵ௖ = 0.3723)14 and an extremely high second-period consumption tax (߬ଵ௖ = 2.6258) so as 
to finance the increased provision of public goods and a very high income subsidy in the second 
period (߬ଶ௬ = −1.3471) .This is a reminiscent of the quite large income subsidy and 
consumption tax, well in excess of 100%, in Coleman (2000) and many others. The related 
                                                 
14 First-period income tax rate ߬ଵ௬ is given and set equal to 0.15 and, therefore, there is no need for the 
government to offset any distortionary effects. Hence, the government chooses a first-period 
consumption tax that is lower than 100%, since there is no need to finance an income subsidy and the 
additional revenues by the consumption tax are used to finance a larger amount of public good ݃₁ in the 
first period. 
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literature on optimal taxation derives that the optimal tax mix implies the same constant tax rate 
on consumption and leisure in each period and a zero tax on capital income. Hence, the tax mix 
that achieves the first best allocation is one that taxes consumption, provides the same amount 
of subsidy to labour and imposes a zero capital income tax rate (see Lansing (1999), Coleman 
(2000) and Correia (2010)). The quantitative difference in our results, where the amount of 
labour subsidy is lower than the amount of the consumption tax, is driven by the fact that we 
use a single income tax, rather than separate taxes on capital income and labour income. 
Otherwise, if the Ramsey government can use capital income taxes, labour income taxes and 
consumption taxes, it could attain the first-best allocation. 
Fourth, net income inequality increases when we move from the benchmark regime with 
income taxes to the regimes where the government chooses optimally both income and 
consumption taxes. Hence, the reduction in the optimal second-period income tax benefits 
capitalists more, since they work more, while workers' labour supply is unaffected from 
changes in the optimal income tax rate. Thus, there is a tradeoff between efficiency and 
redistribution. Although the introduction of consumption taxes by a Ramsey government is 
Pareto improving and benefits both capitalists and workers, income inequality increases. The 
mechanism that drives this result is twofold.  
First, a consumption tax alters the savings/consumption decision of the capitalists (see 
equation 2.5) affecting their income from wealth while there is no income from wealth and such 
a decision for the workers. Notice that this channel is also present in the representative agent 
case. Moreover, the degree of substitution between consumption and income taxes in the 
optimal policy setting with heterogeneous agents determines the nature of the distributional 
implications of the introduction of consumption taxes in an economy with income taxes only. 
In our simulations, and for the specific parameter values we have experimented with, this 
channel leads to higher net income inequality. 
Second, the change in capital caused by consumption taxes has differential effects in the 
income from labour (due to productivity differences), which results to labour income 
inequality.15 However, we should report that our results do not depend on the assumption of 
different labour productivities among capitalists and workers although in the absence of this 
differentiation the regressive distributional implications of introducing consumption taxes get 
weaker. The introduction of consumption taxes in an economy with income taxes only can still 
be regressive, even in the absence of different labour productivities, as long as, workers are not 
                                                 
15 As explained in section 4, we choose to differentiate labour productivities for two reasons: First, 
because this assumption is consistent with literature on inequality and especially with that strand of 
literature that has examined the occupational choice of economic agents, usually focusing on the 
distinction between entrepreneurs and workers and its implications for skill acquisition (see, e.g., 
Quadrini 2000; Matsuyama 2006; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009), and second, because it allows us 
to get a solution for the labour supply of capitalists within accepted range. 
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allowed to save, or in case they are allowed, they face a higher - than capitalists - transaction 
cost for participating at the capital market. 
Therefore, at least in our numerical simulations, and for the specific parameter values we 
have used, both the above described channels seem to lead to higher net income inequality.16 
4.4 Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms when Policy is Chosen Optimally 
In this section, we study again the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing 
consumption taxes into a model with income taxes only, when the government chooses 
optimally both income and consumption taxes, but we focus mainly on the case in which the 
overall public spending remains constant and equal to its value when the government chooses 
optimally only the income tax rate. Thus, we choose to work as follows. First, we solve for the 
Ramsey/commitment equilibrium when the government chooses optimally the second-period 
income tax rate only. Thus, the government chooses ߬ଶ௬, ݃₁, ݃₂  to maximize a weighted average 
of the utilities of the two agents, capitalists and workers, subject to the decentralized 
equilibrium equations, when we exogenously set ߬ଵ௖ =  ߬ଶ௖ = 0. This serves as our benchmark 
regime. Next, we assume that the government can choose optimally both income and 
consumption taxes and we distinguish between two different cases. In the first case, we set 
݃₁, ݃₂ as in the benchmark regime and allow for the government to choose optimally ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖, ߬ଶ௖. 
In the second case, we assume that the government chooses optimally all the policy instruments 
and, particularly, ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖, ߬ଶ௖, ݃₁, ݃₂. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below present the numerical results for 
these cases. 
A comparison of the above cases reveals the following: The economy with the consumption 
taxes is welfare superior, even if we keep ݃₁, ݃₂ constant. For instance, aggregate welfare ܷ 
and second-period output ݕ௙,ଶ are higher. At an individual level, workers are better off, since 
both their welfare ܷ௪ and their second-period net income ݕଶ௪ are higher. On the contrary, 
capitalists are worse off when we allow for the government to set the public spending as in the 
benchmark regime. Notice also that the government chooses to subsidize income and generate 
the necessary revenues to finance its activity by taxing only consumption. This happens because 
consumption taxes are less distorting tax instruments than income taxes. Moreover, in terms of 
inequality, the second-period net income of capitalists relative to workers ௬మೖ௬మೢ   increases when 
the government can choose optimally both income and consumption taxes, even if we keep 
  
                                                 
16 We would like to thank a referee for highlighting this twofold mechanism which allowed us to make 
clearer the intuition behind the distributional implications of the introduction of consumption taxes into 
an economy with income taxes only. 
ECONOMIDES, RIZOS     Optimal Taxation, Efficiency and Redistribution 
 
 29
Table 6.1: Ramsey Equilibrium
 Benchmark Consumption taxes 
 Endogenous ݃௧ Exogenous ݃௧ Endogenous ݃௧ 
Allocations  
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.3547 0.3707 0.2740 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.5156 0.5079 0.4781 
݇௞,ଶ 0.2093 0.1656 0.1597 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3486 0.3239 0.3206 
݈௞,ଶ 0.1713 0.2333 0.2406 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0681 0.0685 0.0504 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0778 0.0828 0.0787 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
ݎଵ 4.7908 4.6317 4.6104 
ݎଶ 1.3168 1.7409 1.8077 
ݓଵ௞ 1.0675 1.0831 1.0852 
ݓଶ௞ 1.8568 1.7409 1.6210 
ݓଵ௪ 0.2135 0.2166 0.2170 
ݓଶ௪ 0.3714 0.3295 0.3242 
Output  
ݕ௙,ଵ 0.7985 0.7720 0.7684 
ݕ௙,ଶ 0.7235 0.7895 0.7937 
ଵܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ 0.2395 0.2316 0.2305 
ଶܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ 0.2171 0.2368 0.2381 
ܥଵ
ଵܻ
 0.6430 0.6875 0.5096 
ܥଶ
ଶܻ
 0.9634 0.8880 0.8337 
 
public spending constant. Hence, the introduction of optimally chosen consumption taxes by a 
Ramsey government in an economy with income taxes only, increases the aggregate efficiency 
but also increases net income inequality; even in the case we maintain the level of public 
spending constant. 
5    A non-utilitarian Ramsey government 
So far we have assumed that the government is utilitarian in the sense that the weights that the 
government attaches to the welfare of capitalists and workers follow their population shares 
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Table 6.2: Ramsey Equilibrium 
 
Benchmark Consumption taxes 
 Endogenous ݃௧ Exogenous ݃௧ Endogenous ݃௧ 
Policy instruments  
߬ଶ௬ 0.4416 -0.7130 -1.3471 
߬ଵ௖ - 0.0073 0.3723 
߬ଶ௖ - 1.5560 2.6258 
ଵ݃ 0.0359 0.0359 0.0783 
݃ଶ 0.1217 0.1217 0.1324 ݃ଵ
ଵܻ
 0.1500 0.1550 0.3398 
݃ଶ
ଶܻ
 0.5605 0.5139 0.5558 
Welfare outcome 
ܷ௞ -1.8331 -1.8404 -1.7782 
ܷ௪ -2.9867 -2.9677 -2.9025 
ܷ -2.6406 -2.6296 -2.5652 
Income Inequality 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
7.6397 7.1827 7.7303 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
4.2620 4.3733 4.2894 
ݕଵ௞  0.5199 0.4923 0.3897 
ݕଵ௪  0.0681 0.0685 0.0504 
ݕଶ௞  0.3314 0.3621 0.3376 
ݕଶ௪  0.0778 0.0828 0.0787 
 
(see e.g. Angelopoulos et al, 2011). But, what will happen if we assume that the government is 
 not utilitarian anymore? This is what we do in this section. In particular, we study the aggregate 
and distributional implications of introducing consumption taxes when the government is not 
utilitarian. We present numerical results (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 respectively) for four cases, 
namely ߛ =  0.4, ߛ =  0.5, ߛ =  0.6, and ߛ =  0.8. Furthermore, we provide a graph (see figure 
1 below) in which the relationship between net income inequality with and without the presence 
of consumption taxes and ߛ (for 0 ≤ ߛ ≤ 1) is depicted. 
As can be seen in Tables 7.1, 7.2 and Figure 1, our main results remain as the ones analyzed 
already in the previous sections of the paper. Thus, also when the government is not utilitarian,  
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Table 7.1: Comparative Static Results with Respect to γ 
 
Only Income Taxes
 γ=0.4 γ=0.5 γ=0.6 γ=0.8 
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.3539 0.3542 0.3544 0.3549 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.5056 0.5091 0.5124 0.5186 
݇௞,ଶ 0.2109 0.2103 0.2098 0.2088 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3495 0.3492 0.3489 0.3483 
݈௞,ଶ 0.1685 0.1695 0.1704 0.1721 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0680 0.0680 0.0680 0.0681 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0760 0.0766 0.0772 0.0783 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
ଵܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ 0.2399 0.2397 0.2396 0.2394 
ଶܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ 0.2159 0.2163 0.2167 0.2174 
߬ଶ௬  0.4568 0.4515 0.4464 0.4369 
ଵ݃ 0.0360 0.0360 0.0359 0.0359 
݃ଶ 0.1255 0.1241 0.1229 0.1205 
௞ܷ -1.8324 -1.8326 -1.8328 -1.8333 
ܷ௪ -2.9873 -2.9870 -2.9869 -2.9866 
ܷ -2.2944 -2.4098 -2.5252 -2.7560 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
7.6581 7.6515 7.6454 7.6342 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
4.2098 4.2284 4.2457 4.2774 
 
 
consumption taxes seem to create substantial welfare gains for the economy as a whole, 
whereas, they also seem to increase inequality by hurting the working class. In other words, the 
efficiency and redistribution effects do not change qualitatively when the government chooses 
to attach a proportional or less/more proportional weight on the welfare of a specific group (i.e. 
a ߛ = or < or > 0.5). Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 1, the increase in net income inequality, 
once we move from an economy with income taxes only to an economy with both income and 
consumption taxes, gets higher the higher is the weight that the governments attaches to 
capitalists' welfare. 
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Table 7.2: Comparative static results with respect to γ 
Income and Consumption Taxes
 γ=0.4 γ=0.5 γ=0.6 γ=0.8 
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.2707 0.2719 0.2730 0.2749 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.4844 0.4824 0.4803 0.4759 
݇௞,ଶ 0.1737 0.1687 0.1641 0.1556 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3284 0.3257 0.3231 0.3184 
݈௞,ଶ 0.2230 0.2294 0.2352 0.2455 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0779 0.0783 0.0785 0.0788 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
ଵܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ 0.2330 0.2322 0.2313 0.2298 
ଶܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ 0.2346 0.2360 0.2372 0.2388 
߬ଶ௬  -0.2511 -0.4982 -0.8406 -2.1735 
߬ଵ௖ 0.3666 0.3686 0.3705 0.3740 
߬ଶ௖ 1.0275 1.3857 1.8847 3.8382 
ଵ݃ 0.0777 0.0779 0.0781 0.0785 
݃ଶ 0.1332 0.1330 0.1327 0.1320 
௞ܷ -1.7742 -1.7754 -1.7768 -1.7797 
ܷ௪ -2.9058 -2.9044 -2.9033 -2.9020 
ܷ -2.2269 -2.3399 -2.4527 -2.6776 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
7.9458 7.8697 7.7980 7.6664 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
4.2546 4.2673 4.2788 4.2991 
 
6    Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we study the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing 
consumption taxes into a model with income taxes only, extended to allow for heterogeneity 
across agents. This heterogeneity is based on the wealth distribution of income. In particular, 
capitalists are allowed to save while workers are not. The government is allowed to choose 
optimally a mix of single income and consumption taxes and the associated amount of the 
provided public good. Notice that we solve for optimal policy with commitment (the so-called 
Ramsey equilibrium) in which policy instruments are chosen once-and-for all at the beginning 
of the time horizon. 
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Figure 1: Net Income Inequality and γ 
 
The main theoretical findings can be summarized as follows: Assuming that a benevolent 
Ramsey government chooses optimally the tax policy mix, consumption taxes turn out to be 
efficiency enhancing, since they are a less distorting policy instrument. In particular, the 
government chooses to decrease the second-period income tax rate and generate the required 
revenues to finance its activities by setting positive consumption taxes. The increased efficiency 
benefits both groups of households, i.e. capitalists and workers. However, these welfare gains 
are accompanied by higher inequality, when the latter is measured by the ratio of net incomes. 
For instance, the net income of capitalists increases by more relative to the net income of 
workers. Thus, we confirm the widespread belief that the introduction of consumption taxes 
into a model with income taxes only, creates substantial efficiency gains for the economy as 
whole, but at the cost of higher net income inequality. Thus, there is a tradeoff between 
efficiency and redistribution, since the introduction of consumption taxes reduces the 
progressivity of the tax system. Therefore, from a normative point of view, this may also justify 
the design of a set of subsidies policies which will aim to outweigh the regressive effects of the 
otherwise more efficient consumption taxes. 
This study can be extended in several ways. For example, one can study the aggregate and 
distributional implications of introducing consumption taxes in the presence of tax evasion or 
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progressive (non-linear) income taxation. Second, one can solve for time-consistent policies 
and compare them with the commitment / Ramsey equilibrium. We leave these extensions for 
future work. 
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A. Appendix 
A.1 First-order Conditions of the Ramsey Government’s Problem 
The first-order conditions with respect to allocations {ܿ௞,ଵ, ܿ௞,ଵ, ݇௞,ଶ, ݈௞,ଵ, ݈௞,ଶ} of capitalists, 
allocations { ܿ௪,ଵ ,  ܿ௪,ଶ }  of workers 17 , prices { ݎ₁, ݎ₂, ݓଵ௞ , ݓଶ௞, ݓଵ௪ , ݓଶ௪ } tax instruments 
{߬ଶ௬, ߬ଵ௖, ߬ଶ௖} and the Lagrange multipliers ߣ = 1 … 13, include the following equations: 
 
wrt ܿ௞,ଵ: 
0 = (1 − ߛ) ߤଵܿ௞,ଵ +
ߤଷ
݃ଵ ߬ଵ
௖݊௞ − ߣଵ(1 + ߬ଵ௖) − ߣଷߤଶ(1 + ߬ଵ௖) + ߣହߚ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ൣ1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ൧        (3.1) 
wrt ܿ௞,ଶ: 
0 = (1 − ߛ) ߚߤଵܿ௞,ଶ + ߚ
ߤଷ
݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௖݊௞ − ߚߣଶ(1 + ߬ଶ௖) − ߚߣସߤଶ(1 + ߬ଶ௖) − ߣହ(1 + ߬ଶ௖)           (3.2) 
wrt ݇௞,ଶ: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௬݊௞ݎଶ − ߣଵ + ߚߣଶ൛1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶൟ                                  
+ ߚߣଽ(ܽ − 1)ܽܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଶ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ଵି௔)
+ ߚߣଵଵܽ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ି௔)
+ ߚߣଵଷܽ(1
− ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ି௔)
                                    (3.3) 
 
  
                                                 
17 Note that we can derive closed-form solutions for the worker's labour supply, given by: ݈ݓ,1 = ݈ݓ,2 =
((ߤ₁)/(ߤ₁ + ߤ₂)) 
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wrt  ݈௞,ଵ: 
0 = −(1 − ߛ) ߤଶ1 − ݈௞,ଵ +
ߤଷ
ଵ݃
߬ଵ௬݊௞ݓଵ௞ + ߣଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞ − ߣଷߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞
+ ߣ଼(1 − ܽ)ܽܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଵ൰
(ି௔)
+ ߣଵ଴(−ܽ)(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଵ൰
(ି௔ିଵ)
ܣ௞
+ ߣଵଶ(−ܽ)(1
− ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଵ൰
(ି௔ିଵ)
ܣ௞                            (3.4) 
wrt  ݈௞,ଶ: 
0 = −(1 − ߛ)ߚ ߤଶ1 − ݈௞,ଶ + ߚ
ߤଷ
݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௬݊௞ݓଶ௞ + ߚߣଶ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞ − ߚߣସߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞
+ ߚߣଽ(1 − ܽ)ܽܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ି௔)
+ ߚߣଵଵ(−ܽ)(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ି௔ିଵ)
ܣ௞
+ ߚߣଵଷ(−ܽ)(1
− ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ + ܣ௪
݊௪
݊௞ ݈௪,ଶ൰
(ି௔ିଵ)
ܣ௞                             (3.5) 
 
wrt ܿ௪,ଵ: 
0 = ߛ ߤଵܿ௪,ଵ +
ߤଷ
݃ଵ ߬ଵ
௖݊௪ − ߣ଺(1 + ߬ଵ௖)                             (3.6) 
 
wrt ܿ௪,ଶ: 
0 = ߛߚ ߤଵܿ௪,ଶ + ߚ
ߤଷ
݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௖݊௪ − ߚߣ଻(1 + ߬ଶ௖)                     (3.7) 
wrt ݎଵ: 
0 = ߤଷ
ଵ݃
߬ଵ௬݊௞݇௞,ଵ + ߣଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯݇௞,ଵ − ߣ଼                     (3.8) 
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wrt ݎଶ: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௬݊௞݇௞,ଶ + ߚߣଶ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯݇௞,ଶ + ߣହߚܿ௞,ଵ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ − ߚߣଽ    (3.9) 
wrt ݓଵ௞: 
0 = ߤଷ
ଵ݃
߬ଵ௬݊௞݈௞,ଵ + ߣଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯݈௞,ଵ + ߣଷߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯൫1 − ݈௞,ଵ൯ − ߣଵ଴    (3.10) 
wrt ݓଶ௞: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௬݊௞݈௞,ଶ + ߚߣଶ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯݈௞,ଶ + ߚߣସߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯ − ߚߣଵଵ  (3.11) 
wrt ݓଵ௪: 
0 = ߤଷ
ଵ݃
߬ଵ௬݊௪݈௪,ଵ + ߣ଺൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯݈௪,ଵ − ߣଵଶ                     (3.12) 
wrt ݓଶ௪: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ߬ଶ
௬݊௪݈௪,ଶ + ߚߣ଻൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯݈௪,ଶ − ߚߣଵଷ            (3.13) 
 
 
wrt ߬ଶ௬: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ൣ݊
௞൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ + ݊௪ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ൧ − ߚߣଶ൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯
− ߣସߚߤଵݓଶ௞൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯ − ߣହߚܿ௞,ଵ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ݎଶ
− ߚߣ଻ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ                                                                                     (3.14) 
wrt ߬ଵ௖:  
0 = ߤଷ
ଵ݃
൫݊௞ܿ௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଵ൯ − ߣଵܿ௞,ଵ − ߣଷߤଶܿ௞,ଵ + ߣହߚܿ௞,ଵൣ1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ൧  
− ߣ଺ܿ௪,ଵ                                                                                               (3.15)  
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wrt ߬ଶ௖: 
0 = ߚ ߤଷ݃ଶ ൫݊
௞ܿ௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଶ൯ − ߚߣଶܿ௞,ଶ − ߚߣସߤଶܿ௞,ଶ − ߣହܿ௞,ଶ − ߚߣ଻ܿ௪,ଶ (3.16) 
wrt ߣଵ: 
0 = (1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଵ + ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯൫ݎଵ݇௞,ଵ + ݓଵ௞݈௞,ଵ൯ − (1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ − ݇௞,ଶ      (3.17) 
wrt ߣଶ: 
0 = ߚ൛(1 − ߜ)݇௞,ଶ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯൫ݎଶ݇௞,ଶ + ݓଶ௞݈௞,ଶ൯ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶൟ         (3.18) 
wrt ߣଷ: 
0 = ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௞൫1 − ݈௞,ଵ൯ − ߤଶ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵ   (3.19) 
wrt ߣସ: 
0 = ߚ൛ߤଵ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௞൫1 − ݈௞,ଶ൯ − ߤଶ(1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶൟ     (3.20) 
wrt ߣହ: 
0 = ߚ(1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௞,ଵൣ1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ൧ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௞,ଶ     (3.21) 
wrt ߣ଺: 
0 = ൫1 − ߬ଵ௬൯ݓଵ௪݈௪,ଵ − (1 + ߬ଵ௖)ܿ௪,ଵ    (3.22) 
wrt ߣ଻: 
0 = ߚ൛൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݓଶ௪݈௪,ଶ − (1 + ߬ଶ௖)ܿ௪,ଶൟ      (3.23) 
wrt ߣ଼: 
0 = ܽܣ݇௞,ଵ௔ିଵ(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ଵି௔ − ݎଵ       (3.24) 
wrt ߣଽ: 
0 = ߚ{ܽܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ିଵ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ଵି௔
− ݎଶ}         (3.25) 
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wrt ߣଵ଴: 
0 = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ି௔ − ݓଵ௞    (3.26) 
wrt ߣଵଵ: 
0 = ߚ ቊ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௞ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ି௔
− ݓଶ௞ቋ      (3.27) 
wrt ߣଵଶ: 
0 = (1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଵ௔(ܣ௞݈௞,ଵ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଵ)ି௔ − ݓଵ௪   (3.28) 
wrt ߣଵଷ: 
0 = ߚ ቊ(1 − ܽ)ܣ௪ܣ݇௞,ଶ௔ ൬ܣ௞݈௞,ଶ +
݊௪
݊௞ ܣ
௪݈௪,ଶ൰
ି௔
− ݓଶ௪ቋ    (3.29) 
                                                                             
Moreover, for the regime with the flat consumption tax rate, the associated first-order condition 
is: 
wrt ߬௖: 
0 = ߤଷ
ଵ݃
൫݊௞ܿ௞,ଵ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଵ൯ − ߣଵܿ௞,ଵ − ߣଷߤଶܿ௞,ଵ + ߣହߚܿ௞,ଵൣ1 − ߜ + ൫1 − ߬ଶ௬൯ݎଶ൧
− ߣ଺ܿ௪,ଵ + ߚ
ߤଷ
݃ଶ ൫݊
௞ܿ௞,ଶ + ݊௪ܿ௪,ଶ൯ − ߚߣଶܿ௞,ଶ − ߚߣସߤଶܿ௞,ଶ
− ߣହܿ௞,ଶ − ߚߣ଻ܿ௪,ଶ 
 
A.2 A Three Period-Model 
Notice that for the three-period model we assume the same parameter values as in those 
presented in table 2. We choose to work as follows. First, we solve for the Ramsey/commitment 
equilibrium when the government chooses optimally the second-period and the third period 
income tax rates. Thus, the government chooses ߬ଶ௬ , ߬ଷ௬ ,݃₁, ݃₂, ݃₃ to maximize a weighted 
average of the utilities of the two agents, capitalists and workers, subject to the decentralized 
equilibrium equations, when we exogenously set ߬ଵ௖ = ߬ଶ௖ = ߬ଷ௖ = 0 . This serves as our 
benchmark regime. Next, we assume that the government can choose optimally both income 
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and consumption taxes and we solve for two different cases. In the first regime, we introduce a 
flat consumption tax ߬௖ = ߬ଵ௖ = ߬ଶ௖ = ߬ଷ௖ that is common for all periods and the government 
chooses optimally ߬ଶ௬, ߬ଷ௬,݃₁, ݃₂, ݃₃, ߬௖. In the second regime, we assume that the government 
chooses optimally, among others, three different consumption taxes, one in each period, ߬ଵ௖ ≠
߬ଶ௖ ≠ ߬ଷ௖. A numerical solution for these regimes is presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below. 
 
Table 8.1: Ramsey Equilibrium – 3 Periods
 
 Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠ ߬ଶ௖ ≠ ߬ଷ௖ 
Allocations  
ܿ௞,ଵ 0.3244 0.2336 0.2589 
ܿ௞,ଶ 0.5201 0.4680 0.3918 
ܿ௞,ଷ 0.6156 0.6633 0.7340 
݇௞,ଶ 0.2805 0.2536 0.2246 
݇௞,ଷ 0.3526 0.4027 0.4625 
݈௞,ଵ 0.3903 0.3743 0.3574 
݈௞,ଶ 0.3008 0.3130 0.3148 
݈௞,ଷ 0.1290 0.1672 0.2177 
ܿ௪,ଵ 0.0655 0.0467 0.0504 
ܿ௪,ଶ 0.0930 0.0852 0.0715 
ܿ௪,ଷ 0.0883 0.0996 0.1173 
݈௪,ଵ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଶ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
݈௪,ଷ 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 
Output  
ݕ௙,ଵ 0.8425 0.8258 0.8079 
ݕ௙,ଶ 1.0621 1.0538 1.0192 
ݕ௙,ଷ 0.7416 0.8704 1.0359 
ଵܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଵ 0.2527 0.2477 0.2424 
ଶܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଶ 0.3186 0.3161 0.3058 
ଷܻ = ݊௞ݕ௙,ଷ 0.2225 0.2611 0.3108 
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Table 8.2: Ramsey Equilibrium – 3 Periods
Benchmark Flat consumption tax Consumption taxes 
 ߬௖=0 ߬௖ ≠ 0 ߬ଵ௖ ≠ ߬ଶ௖ ≠ ߬ଷ௖ 
Policy instruments  
߬ଶ௬ 0.3273 0.0805 -0.3641 
߬ଷ௬ 0.4783 0.1588 -1.1535 
߬ଵ௖ - - 0.3447 
߬ଶ௖ - - 1.4461 
߬ଷ௖ - - 2.1233 
߬௖ - 0.4371 - 
ଵ݃ 0.0379 0.0821 0.0753 
݃ଶ 0.1230 0.1173 0.1117 
݃ଷ 0.1407 0.1702 0.2015 
Welfare 
ܷ௞ -2.4459 -2.3911 -2.3955 
ܷ௪ -4.0304 -3.9545 -3.9379 
ܷ -3.5550 -3.4855 -3.4752 
Income Inequality 
ݕ1݇ݕ1ݓ 
8.4339 9.4961 8.7266 
ݕ2݇ݕ2ݓ 
6.7303 7.6038 9.1867 
ݕ3݇ݕ3ݓ 
3.4564 3.1027 2.7884 
ݕଵ௞  0.5609 0.4433 0.4394 
ݕଵ௪  0.0665 0.0467 0.0504 
ݕଶ௞  0.6258 0.6475 0.6567 
ݕଶ௪  0.0930 0.0852 0.0715 
ݕଷ௞  0.3054 0.3089 0.3271 
ݕଷ௪  0.0883 0.0996 0.1173 
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A.3 Figures 
Figure 2: Reforms 
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